Introduction 1
According to the resource-based view as well as to the knowledge-based view of the firm (Penrose 1959; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Grant 1996; Nonaka, Toyama et al. 2000) , innovation and long run survival require access to external knowledge. Considerable parts of the respective knowledge are, however, not freely available or cannot be simply bought on the market. The main reason is that -in contrast to information -knowledge may be of a tacit nature (i.e., not codified), highly context specific, and may require certain capabilities in order to be absorbed. Integration into regional innovation networks can help firms to obtain this knowledge (e.g., Sternberg 2000; Fritsch 2001; Borgatti and Foster 2003) . Empirical studies suggest that a transfer of knowledge may considerably benefit from embeddedness into networks and spatial proximity to network partners (Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Feldman 1999; Fritsch and Slavtchev 2007) . However, the role of different types of actors in an innovation network as well as the benefits of strong versus weak network ties for such a transfer is largely unclear.
In this paper, we analyze the transfer of knowledge and information in 16
German regional innovation networks. We will particularly highlight the effect of the network structure, the position of an actor within the network, and the strength of the relationship. The data allow us to study the conditions that foster the transfer and the absorption of knowledge and information within the networks. In the following section (section 2), we review some key findings and hypotheses of earlier studies of regional innovation networks. Section 3 introduces the data and the measurement of variables used in the analysis. The results are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Information and knowledge exchange within regional networks of innovation
The advantage of the network form of organization as compared to market and hierarchy depends on the uncertainty of demand, the complexity of tasks, the asset specificity as well as the frequency of exchanges (Jones, Hesterly et al. 1997) . Because partners in an innovation network tend to have closely related interests (Cowan, David et al, 2000) , the chances of gaining valuable information and knowledge in such a network are relatively high. In addition to cognitive and technological proximity, social proximity within a network can be conducive to making information credible and interpretable (Uzzi 1996) . It is often argued that ties which are embedded in a network tend to foster rapid and explicit feedback as well as joint problem-solving arrangements that may help the network members to generate new solutions and (re)combinations of ideas (Uzzi 1996) . Furthermore, repeated interaction can shape the actors' mutual expectations towards trustful behavior, which may considerably improve the quality of exchange and the result of the interaction (Axelsson 1992 , Lundvall 1993 Powell 1990; McEvily and Zaheer 2006; Daskalakis and Kauffeld-Monz 2007) . Thus, the benefits of regional networks of innovation derive not only from reduced transaction costs and risk but also from access to valuable knowledge and information (Malmberg and Maskell 2002) . This implies that embeddedness in a network may strengthen a firms' ability to be innovative.
The literature on regional innovation networks is closely related to the discussion about industrial districts, clusters (Feldman and Braunerhjelm 2006) , and localized spillovers (e.g., Breschi and Lissoni 2001 ). An important difference between innovation networks and clusters or industrial districts is that firms located in a cluster may benefit from other firms or from public research institutions even without having any explicit relationship to these actors, e.g., by 'pure' spatial knowledge spillovers.
However, innovation networks are based on direct relations, and the exchange processes within networks are critically affected by the very nature of knowledge and information. Knowledge and information differ considerably with regard to their sensitivity to spatial distance to a communication partner. While the costs of an information transfer tend to be largely independent of spatial distance, an exchange of knowledge often requires face-to-face contacts, especially if the knowledge is not codified but tacit (Polanyi 1967) . Tacit knowledge is bound to the person that possesses the knowledge and a transfer of this knowledge requires personal face-to-face contact (Teece 1981; von Hippel 1994; Asheim and Isaken 2002) . For this reason, the spatial proximity as such is not important for the transfer of knowledge, but rather the factual existence of network ties within spatial proximity (Lissoni 2001) .
A prominent hypothesis put forward by Granovetter (1973 Granovetter ( , 1985 Granovetter ( , 2005 ) is based on the idea that 'strong ties' characterize a dense network of actors who are mutually connected to each other (Granovetter 1973) . Since the actors of this (sub)cluster tend to interact frequently, a high share of the information circulating in this social system is redundant. Granovetter posits that new information is mainly obtained through relationships to actors who are not members of the closely connected part of the network, the 'weak ties', rather than through close relationship (strong ties).
However, adopting this argument in the context of innovation activity may be problematic for several reasons. First, Granovetter mainly discusses the effect of social structures on issues such as information about job offerings and new technologies and does not consider the generation of knowledge that is in the core of innovation activity (Granovetter 1973 (Granovetter , 1985 (Granovetter , 2005 . In such a context, the gathering of information through weak ties may be more important than trust and openness of exchange which is the domain of strong ties. Obviously, whether strong or weak ties turn out to be more favorable depends on the characteristics of the subject that has to be transferred. While strong ties may be better suited for an exchange of complex knowledge, weak ties could be more beneficial for searching for information (Hansen 1999) .
A second caveat against transferring Granovetter's argument to the context of innovation networks is that his original analysis (Granovetter 1973 ) only refers to dyadic relationships and not to entire networks.
Thirdly, as stated by Burt (1992) , information benefits are expected to travel over all bridges, strong or weak. Burt argues that not the strength of (Gudmundsson and Lechner 2006) . Empirical research (Gudmundsson and Lechner 2006; Kadushin 2002) indicates that cohesion and brokerage are not necessarily in conflict but can both be combined in a productive manner. Therefore, structural holes can be regarded as a source of value added while network cohesion may be essential for realizing the value buried in a hole (Burt 2001) . A bridge that connects actors which are not otherwise linked can be considered social capital (Burt 2001) .
3 Hypotheses, data, and measurement
Hypotheses
Our empirical study of network relationships is focused on the following three hypotheses. In contrast to Granovetter's hypothesis concerning the 'strength of weak ties', we posit that in the context of regional innovation networks weak ties are not conducive to the transfer of knowledge and information (hypothesis 1). On the contrary, we assume that especially strong ties enable the exchange of information and knowledge when interactions and outcomes are accompanied by a high degree of risk and uncertainty and when knowledge with tacit dimensions is involved. It may be argued that this hypothesis holds particularly for knowledge but does not pertain to the exchange of information. However, beyond the 'tacit knowledge' argument, there is another reason for the advantage of strong ties. In order to be able to perform an information selection function for a network partner (e.g., filtering the relevant information), an actor has to be aware of the needs and the deficiencies of the potential receiver of information.
Moreover, firms typically do not disclose sensitive information without having a strong tie to the respective actor. Therefore, the information selection function works better if it is based on strong ties.
We expect that network cohesion is conducive to the transfer of knowledge and information (hypothesis 2) for two reasons. First, network cohesion makes the transfer of knowledge and information easier due to more direct links between the parties involved. Information and knowledge is more accurately and timely transmitted in networks where many actors are directly connected to each other, particularly, if appropriate interfaces between the partners are established. Transfer over a longer distance is more complicated, may take more time, and there is a higher probability of mistakes and distortions (Cross, Parker et al. 2002) . Thus, network cohesion should result in a higher level and higher accuracy of information and knowledge transferred. Second, a high level of network cohesion is conducive to the emergence of reputation effects. This implies that any kind of information pathology (Scholl 1999 ) such as closure, distortion, or delay as well as unintended disclosure of knowledge is more likely to be noticed and sanctioned in a dense network than in networks which are more fragmented. If reputation effects are at work, every actor has strong incentives to transfer information and knowledge fully, accurately, and timely as well as to handle business secrets with the appropriate amount of care.
The benefits that result from bridging a structural hole by a broker may be diverse. Among these benefits is the reduction of information asymmetries. Nooteboom (2003) points out that problems of "asymmetric information" can be reduced if there are bridging or mediating agents available. Brokers may act as arbitrators of simple contracts and can help to alleviate misunderstandings. If a broker has a good reputation within the network, this may help to control the risk of spillovers and mediate the building and maintenance of trust (Zucker 1986; Shapiro 1987; Nooteboom 2003) . Clearly, bridging a structural hole may entail benefits for the respective actor as well as for the sub-networks that are connected.
Thus, we expect social returns as well as private benefits resulting from brokerage (hypothesis 3).
Data
Our analysis is based on detailed information about 16 East German regional innovation networks that were initiated in 1999. This implies that the networks in our sample are at a relatively early stage of development.
The networks have been selected in the promotion policy program "InnoRegio", which aimed to improve regional innovation systems (see and control technology as well as textiles (Eickelpasch and Kauffeld et al. 2002b ). The firms in the selected networks exhibit an above average performance with regard to R&D, the introduction of new products on the market and they consider themselves to be more competitive than most of the other suppliers in the respective market (Eickelpasch and Kauffeld et al. 2002b) . For this reason, there is a certain sample selection bias with regard to innovation attitudes, innovative capacities as well as expectations about future growth.
Measurement

Network construction
The data were gathered by postal questionnaires in the year 2004 that resulted in a quite high response rate of about 80 percent. Each actor of a network was asked to name his most important partner(s) within the network. Organizations which participated in a network but did not respond the questionnaire have been included in the analysis if at least two of the responding actors named the non-responding actor as one of their "most important partners". In this manner, we tried to capture the complete network. On average, actors named three partners, in most cases members of their actual R&D-co-operations, as "most important partners".
3
On the basis of these links we generated a network matrix for each network. These matrices have been transformed into graphical expositions that allow for identify reciprocal and non-reciprocal links. We assume that knowledge and information is transferred along these links. As an example, figure 1 shows a network graph for one of the innovation networks in our sample. The arrowheads indicate the direction of the knowledge flows. A considerable portion of the network links (about 60 percent) was non-reciprocal. There are, however, considerable differences between the networks with respect to the degree of reciprocity, which ranges from 20 percent up to 80 percent (see table A2 in the Appendix).
Notes: O = firm; ☐ = public research; the numbers identify the individual actors; bold arrow = reciprocal tie; semi-bold arrow = non-reciprocal link; arrowheads = direction of knowledge-flow; symbol size = extent of knowledge absorption.
Fig. 1 Example of a network graph
health industry, musical instruments 3 More than 500 R&D-projects were conducted and granted in the program. They differ considerably in regard to their research topics, duration, financial volume, partners involved. However, the subsidies are basically restricted to the early stage of innovation.
Dependent variables
With regard to the different types and dimensions of knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Cowan, David et al. 2000) , our analysis focuses mainly on the technological know-how exchanged between actors, measured by "the extent of technological support" provided or received (see table A1 in the Appendix). However, there also may be some degree of "know-what" (declaratory / factual knowledge) as well as "know-why"
(scientific knowledge) included in these flows. We have strong indication from in-depth interviews with selected network members that a considerable part of the transferred knowledge is of a "tacit nature".
We measured the exchange of information as "the extent of information and suggestions" provided or received. In-depth interviews with network actors have shown that this information may refer to market conditions, competences of potential partners as well as to management practices. In comparison to knowledge, such types of information should be subject to transfer barriers resulting from tacitness, high context specificity or inappropriate 'codebooks to a lesser extent and can be expected to travel easier along the network links.
We constructed four indicators for the exchange of information and knowledge that were the dependent variables in our regressions:
(1) The extent of information transferred to network partners.
(2) The extent of knowledge transferred to network partners.
(3) The extent of information absorbed from network partners.
(4) The extent of knowledge absorbed from network partners.
The extent has been measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "very few" to "very much" (see table A1 in the Appendix).
Independent variables
The independent variables refer to four spheres of influence (figure 2).
These are:
(a) The characteristics of the entire network (network cohesion, heterogeneity of competences).
(b) The characteristics of each actor's ego-network (density, tie strength).
(c) The positions of an actor in his ego-network (e.g., broker position).
(d) The individual characteristics of an actor (firm size, experience with R&D-cooperation). In line with the Schumpeterian tradition, we assume that entrepreneurial opportunities may occur by (re)combinations of different, previously unconnected resources and, therefore, refer to the variety of knowledge bases, competences, and resources. Thus, we suppose that heterogeneity of competences constitutes a more meaningful indicator rather than the more structural concept of (non-)redundancy. However, our measurement of heterogeneity does not assume that the more actors 'on board' means the higher the diversity will be. Instead of the mere size of a network, we draw on information about the scope of the network members' competencies that has been elicited in the postal questionnaire.
Heterogeneity of competences is measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "not at all" to "completely heterogeneous".
(b) Whereas the network characteristics refer to the entire network and, therefore, involve direct as well as indirect ties, the ego-network of an actor contains only those network members to which the respective actor is linked directly. Following McEvily and Zaheer (1999), we assume that the frequency of interaction -as employed by Granovetter (1973) -is only a rather rough measure of tie strength. In the context of innovation activities, it would be more adequate to refer to the scope (multiplicity) and the intensity of the relationship. Hence, we employ the "degree of trust between direct network partner(s)" as an indicator of tie strength. This degree of trust is measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "not at all" to "completely trusting". We also account for the density of an ego-network; thereby, expecting a positive relationship between the egonetwork density and the extent to which information or knowledge is exchanged. The density of an ego-network is measured as its number of factual ties divided by the number of possible ties.
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(c) A further factor that may be important for the exchange of information and knowledge is the specific position of network actors in their egonetwork. We focus here on broker positions of an actor. According to Gould and Fernandez (1989) four types of brokerage positions may be distinguished from the perspective of an actor who belongs to the group of the private firms. The four types of brokerage are the following: first, brokerage between two private sector firms (coordinator); second, linking two members of the public research sector (consultant); third, relating a private firm and a public research organization, whereas "flows" occur from the former to the latter (representative); fourth, brokerage between a private firm and a public research organization, whereas "flows" occur from public research to private businesses (gatekeeper). Such a distinction may, however, be rather arbitrary because actors may, for example, simultaneously assume the role of a "gatekeeper" and the role of a "representative" because the exchange of knowledge and information is of a reciprocal nature. For this reason, we do not follow this distinction but assign a broker function to each of these positions, i.e., whenever an actor indirectly connects two other actors of his ego-network which are not otherwise directly linked to each other. The number of these brokerage positions indicates the degree to which an actor is bridging structural holes in his ego-network. 6 Hence, we strongly separate the structural holes measure from the tie strength. In order to avoid size effects of this measurement, we normalized the number of broker roles by dividing it by the number of potential ties in an actors' ego-network. 
Results
Our analysis clearly shows a high level of information and knowledge exchange among the members of the networks in our sample (figure 3).
The group of actors that benefited the most from the absorption of knowledge is the manufacturing firms followed by the private research organizations. The main sources of knowledge were the private research organizations and the service firms. The differences among the other groups of actors with regard to the degree of information absorbed (public research organizations, service firms, universities and associate research institutes ("An-Institute") are relatively small. It is, however, remarkable that the respective value is relatively low for the public research organizations. With regard to information transferred, we again find the universities in first place followed by the service firms, the public research organizations, and then the other three types of actors. The relatively intense participation of the universities in the transmission as well as in the absorption of knowledge strongly indicates that the respective innovation processes were not linear in character but were characterized by pronounced feedback-loops. Non-university public research organizations 7 It could be argued that it would be more adequate to apply betweenness-centrality as a measure for brokerage. Betweenness-centrality refers to the entire network and counts how often an actor is located at the shortest path (geodesic distance) of all pairs of actors who are not linked directly. It indicates an actor's possibilities to control the relation between two other network actors. We do not apply betweenness-centrality because this measure is not adequate for transfers of highly specific tacit knowledge which does not travel "long distances" in terms of nodes that have to be crossed. 8 Classification by number of employees: 1-10; 11-50; 51-100; 101-250; 250 plus. The further analyses focus on the transfer of information and knowledge into the private sector, i.e., to the manufacturing and the service firms in the sample. 9 194 private firms took part in the inquiry. For some of the firms we obtained multiple responses because they conducted more than one collaborative R&D-project in their network.
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9 Initial comparative analyses confirm our assumption that with regard to different groups of regional innovation systems (private sector, public science) the mechanisms that are positively related to exchange processes vary due to their relative importance.
10 There were 322 responses from private sector firms that have been aggregated to the firm level. All measures for the network properties (e.g., network cohesion, ego-network and fostered by a highly cohesive network structure is apparently not highly valued by the network partners. An additional type of network characteristic that may influence the exchange of information and knowledge is the heterogeneity of density, brokerage) include also the other types of actors such as universities and nonuniversity public research institutions.
competences of the network partners. Heterogeneity can be regarded as an extension of the more structural concept of non-redundancy. It refers to innovation opportunities that result from a (re)combination of different competences. We suppose that heterogeneity of competences serves as a better indicator than (non-)redundancy. In the literature, it is quite frequently supposed that heterogeneity in terms of divergence of knowledge, competences, resources, and problem solving capabilities is positively related to the exploration of opportunities (Gilsing and Nooteboom 2006) . The respective ties stimulate the implementation of new routines, may expand the organizational boundaries into previously uncharted markets, and can be regarded as conduits of second-order learning processes (Bateson 1972; March 1991; Levinthal and March 1993) . However, exploitation refers to the refinement and extension of current routines that strengthen the economic activities in known knowledge domains and gives rise to first-order learning (Bateson 1972; March 1991) . According to our estimates, the extent of heterogeneity of competences among network partners has no statistically significant impact on the firms' knowledge and information exchange (table 1, models 1 -4). Following March's strict differentiation between exploration and exploitation (March 1991) , this result indicates that the firms involved in the networks under study obviously tend to be more interested in exploitation than in exploration.
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We found that the actors which assume broker positions are not able to gain particular advantages in terms of the absorption of information or knowledge (table 1, Firm size is significant only with respect to the transfer of knowledge and not the transfer of information. Surprisingly, the smaller the firm is, leads to more knowledge being transferred to network partners. Obviously, smaller firms were more engaged in the transfer processes within the network. We find that absorptive capacity in terms of experience in conducting R&D with partners is more important for the absorption of external information and knowledge than firm size.
Discussion and conclusions
Our analysis showed that embeddedness within an innovation network is positively related to an inter-organizational exchange of knowledge and information. We found that particularly strong ties are important prerequisites for such a division of information and knowledge. In interpreting the result one should, however, keep in mind that embeddedness in strong ties may also lead to lock-in (Grabher, 1993) or entropic death (Camagni, 1991) and can well have negative effects on innovation performance. Such effects were, however, unlikely to occur in our study because the networks in our sample were collected at an early stage of development. Firms can obtain the optimal balance between essential tie strength and regional embeddedness, on the one hand, and the avoidance of cognitive lock-in, on the other hand, by searching for heterogeneous knowledge outside their regional network. It would, therefore, be rather interesting to perform the analysis for older, wellestablished networks or for the networks in our sample at a later stage in their development. Hite and Hesterly (2001) suggest that firms at an early stage of development gain higher benefits from a more cohesive network whereas they exploit network benefits that derive from bridging structural holes when they arrive at more advanced stages of their development. This, however, cannot fully explain why the firms in our sample do not benefit from their brokering positions. Thus, more investigations should be dedicated to the conditions that enable the exploitation of benefits resulting from brokerage. 
